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Abstract 
[Excerpt] In their listing of top news stories of 1985 in the economically depressed Youngstown-Warren 
area, local newspapers consistently listed "Saturn mania" near the top. In an effort to attract the Saturn 
project, the local community offered GM a sizable economic development package, organized a 100-car 
caravan to GM headquarters delivering 200,000 letters from local residents and school children, and 
bought billboard space and television time in Detroit. 
This continuation of Saturn mania belies the belief that it was an essentially harmless exercise in 
corporate public relations. Rather, there is much evidence to suggest that throughout the Saturn 
campaign GM misled the public about its intention to build an inexpensive small car; diverted public and 
union attention from its plans for plant closings, technological displacement and the importing of cars 
from its foreign subsidiaries; forced additional concessions that have weakened the UAW; and shaped the 
public debate surrounding U.S. economic decline and future economic development. 
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What GM's Saturn Project 
Is Really About 
*John Russo 
Mr. Roger B. Smith 
President, General Motors 
Detroit, Michigan 48202 
Dear Mr. Smith: 
I hope you will consider building the Saturn plant in the 
Mahoning Valley. I would like it to be here because it would make 
thousands of jobs and it will ease the 32.9% unemployment rate. 
Please do not rule us out because Lordstown is here. The Mahoning 
Valley is well suited for the Saturn plant. Some reasons are it is 
near transportation and resources and our people are willing to work 
and they work hard. 
I hope your car beats the imports and brings many Americans a 
job. 
Sincerely, 
Alexander Russo 
(age 10) 
• John Russo is Director of Labor Studies at Youngstown State University and the 
father of Alexander Russo. 
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In their listing of top news stories of 1985 in the economically 
depressed Youngstown-Warren area, local newspapers consistently 
listed "Saturn mania" near the top. In an effort to attract the Saturn 
project, the local community offered GM a sizable economic 
development package, organized a 100-car caravan to GM head-
quarters delivering 200,000 letters from local residents and school 
children, and bought billboard space and television time in Detroit. 
This experience was repeated throughout the nation, as the 
Saturn Project became a cause celebre, with politicians and 
community leaders offering the world's largest industrial 
corporation tax abatements and exemptions, utility rate reductions, 
industrial revenue bonds, new highways and access routes, union 
free atmospheres, and free land and training. 
Much of the public attention surrounding Saturn was lost with 
the July 1985 announcement that the plant would be located in 
Spring Hill, Tennessee. Yet, Saturn remains a hotly debated subject 
as state and local governments assess the reasons for GM's 
decision, as other corporations ask for "incentive packages" similar 
to those offered to GM, and as labor unions are asked to 
renegotiate labor contracts similar to the new GM-UAW Saturn 
agreement. 
This continuation of Saturn mania belies the belief that it was 
an essentially harmless exercise in corporate public relations. 
Rather, there is much evidence to suggest that throughout the 
Saturn campaign GM misled the public about its intention to build 
an inexpensive small car; diverted public and union attention from 
its plans for plant closings, technological displacement and the 
importing of cars from its foreign subsidiaries; forced additional 
concessions that have weakened the UAW; and shaped the public 
debate surrounding U.S. economic decline and future economic 
development. 
What Is Saturn? 
The Saturn Project was sold to the nation as an attempt by GM 
to compete in the low cost, high mileage, subcompact car market, 
using the most modern technology, production techniques and 
labor-management relations. The inexpensive subcompact market 
has been totally dominated by GM's domestic and foreign 
competitors. This is largely the result of GM's past indifference 
to the subcompact market due to its low profit margin per car. 
To indicate its seriousness, GM developed a subcompact 
prototype which figured prominently in GM's campaign to sell 
the Saturn Project. Using nationalistic advertising (the same people 
who gave us "hot dogs, ar 
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who gave us "hot dogs, apple pie and Chevrolet"), GM presented 
the Saturn prototype as America's answer to "The Japanese 
Challenge." This public relations campaign was an unqualified 
success in generating name recognition and public interest and 
enthusiasm. But the media circus was a ruse, for GM knew all 
along that economics worked against exclusive production of an 
inexpensive small car at the Saturn site. 
According to GM officials, for Saturn to be successful, it would 
have to attract 80% of its subcompact business from current non-
GM buyers. This would be difficult in the subcompact market 
given the present level of product quality and the power of brand 
loyalty; with Japanese manufacturers increasing their exports and 
building their own U.S. assembly plants; with South Korean 
(Hyundai) and Yugoslavian (Yugo) producers introducing inexpen-
sive small cars into the American market; and with the Spanish 
(SEAT), Czechs (Skoda Rapide), and Greeks (Desta) all entering 
the U.S. subcompact market in the next four years. At the same 
time, GM itself will be importing 431,000 small cars by 1987 from 
its foreign producers. GM owns 35% of Isuzu (Japan), 5.3% of 
Suzuki (Japan) and 50% of Daewoo (South Korea). 
Given the increased domestic and foreign competition (including 
its own captive imports), the cost advantages of foreign production, 
and the continuing oil glut, it is unlikely that the small car market 
will expand enough or that GM will be able to attract enough non-
GM buyers to justify new subcompact production facilities. This 
suggests that the Saturn (as a subcompact) must have a broader 
appeal than size and fuel economy or that something other than 
an inexpensive subcompact will be made at Spring Hill. The 
production target GM has set for Spring Hill provides a clue to 
its intentions. 
According to the trade paper AutoWeek, GM is unlikely to meet 
its production target of 400,000 to 500,000 vehicles per year at 
the Spring Hill facility by making a single model. It is well known 
in auto circles that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to sell 
300,000 of any one model, especially in the competitive 
subcompact market. (Only 32 domestic models out of some 80 
on the U.S. market sold over 100,000 units and only 10 sold over 
200,000 in 1984.) 
Like other manufacturers, GM operates under certain economic 
assumptions in setting production targets. GM initially announced 
that Saturn would represent an initial capitalization of $ 150 million 
and assets of $5 billion. These costs of production must be 
amortized over the greatest production volume, and this can best 
be achieved using a modular construction system—the kind to be 
•fpT" 
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used in the Saturn Project. In this form of construction, the 
functional portions of a car—such as the powertrains, dashboard 
assemblies, window mechanisms—are standardized, creating high-
volume "platforms" which are modified into individual models. 
Chrysler has perfected modular construction in its production of 
its K-car fleet. 
Given the production volume/amortization equation and the 
unlikely prospect of generating enough subcompact business, it 
is hard to believe that GM didn't know from the very first that 
it would have to build something other than a low-priced 
subcompact at Spring Hill. 
Thus, it is not surprising that GM announced in early 1986 that 
it is considering building something other than a low-priced 
subcompact at the Saturn site. What is likely to result—and what 
GM probably intended from the first—is a new line of cars, using 
modular construction. Thus, the "Saturn" might be a high-priced 
subcompact, a compact or even a midsize car. Whatever the Spring 
Hill complex produces, it will compete in the more profitable 
markets where GM already has considerable capacity. Since new 
car sales have leveled off and are not predicted to grow dramatically 
in the future, this means GM will have to close some existing 
facilities. 
Thus, the Saturn Project is likely to result in another wave of 
plant closings and additional requests for concessions from 
autoworkers, especially at the plant level, to "save their jobs." GM 
has already moved in this direction by announcing in the Spring 
of 1986 its plans to close four assembly plants by 1990. After 
reducing its workforce by 60,000 since 1980, it is likely that GM 
will be able to reduce employment levels still further under the 
Saturn banner. Given this accounting, there seems little reason 
for UAW members to be excited by the 6,000 "new jobs" in 
Tennessee. 
If Saturn is not going to be an inexpensive small car geared to 
meet "The Japanese Challenge," is the Saturn Project just a promo-
tional gimmick to divert attention from GM's plans to import cars, 
close existing facilities and reduce the workforce? The answer is 
surely no. 
The Saturn Project is the core of GM's high-tech diversification 
plan into robots and computerized manufacturing and of its 
continuing effort to undermine the current collective bargaining 
agreement with the UAW. 
The Saturn Project represents a substantial investment for GM. 
The complex in Spring Hill will be composed of five or six factories 
that will make engines, transmissions, metal stampings and plastic 
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Governors of six Midwest states tell Phil Donahue why General 
Motors should locate its Saturn plant in their state. 
parts, which will be moved via computer control to a final 
assembly plant. To make the system work, GM must integrate new 
technology with a new labor relations system. While unconven-
tional by U.S. manufacturing standards, the Saturn plan is nothing 
but an upscale replica of highly integrated Japanese production 
facilities, such as those at "Toyota City." 
What is truly unique about the Saturn Project will be the degree 
of technological sophistication. Like many global corporations, GM 
believes that the best way to stay profitable is to reduce labor and 
production costs through the increased use of technology. 
In the last few years, GM has dramatically increased the number 
of robots in its existing plants. Robots permit auto manufacturers 
increased flexibility over the present system of rigid and fixed 
technology. By merely changing operating programs, GM can use 
robots to adjust to various production constraints; expropriate 
worker skills far beyond traditional time and motion studies; 
reduce the need to meet workplace safety and pollution control; 
while reducing the number of people employed and increasing 
output. 
But GM is not only committed to using robots. It wants to 
produce them. Given the cyclical nature of the auto industry and 
the prospects of new competition, the production of robots and 
new computerized manufacturing systems seems to be a favorable 
direction for diversification. GM President Roger Smith has stated 
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that the company hopes to generate $5 billion to $7 billion in 
annual revenues in this area by 1990. As some autoworkers have 
suggested, by 1995 GM might have to change its name to "General 
Robotics." 
The Saturn plant is where GM's high-tech efforts all come 
together. What better testing ground and showroom for General 
Robotics than the Saturn facilities. Given GM's economic power 
and marketing sophistication, the Saturn Project will be the center 
of GM's diversification efforts and will serve as a primary model 
for U.S. manufacturing in the 1990s. 
The Labor Agreement 
The final piece of the Saturn puzzle is the labor agreement with 
the UAW. GM was emphatic that it would not build Saturn in the 
U.S. unless the UAW released it from the basic auto agreement. 
The UAW agreed to this form of economic blackmail and 
negotiated what it touted as a historic and innovative agreement. 
The Saturn contract must be put in historical perspective. As 
late as 1979, the UAW was the premier industrial union. It was 
at the forefront of the fight for a four-day week, for increases in 
cost-of-living adjustments and managed reductions-in-force. 
Pattern bargaining in the auto industry resulted in UAW gains that 
were duplicated both intra- and inter-industry. But, like other 
unions, the UAW has lost bargaining power, declined in member-
ship, found it difficult to organize new workers, and seen a decline 
in worker militancy. As a result, the UAW has been put on the 
defensive and has negotiated concession agreements that have 
gradually undermined the basis of pattern bargaining and placed 
wages and working conditions increasingly in competition. 
The Saturn agreement is an extension of the UAW's 
concessionary bargaining. The agreement represents a wholesale 
departure from the traditional pattern bargaining that has been 
the basis of industrial unionism. Its basic features are as follows. 
The new agreement creates a two-tiered workforce—Saturn 
Members and Associate Members. Associate Members will 
constitute 20% of the workforce and will not be covered by the 
job security provisions in the agreement. 
The traditional concepts of seniority and job classifications have 
been largely discarded in favor of such concepts as merit, ability, 
job rotation and pay-for-knowledge. While this sounds principled 
and meritocratic, these concepts are vague and have frequently 
meant payoffs, favoritism and speedups. That is why seniority and 
job classification systems were developed. 
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Incentive pay is reintroduced into the auto industry after some 
40 years. The basic salary of Saturn workers will be 80% of the 
basic auto wage. Incentive pay will be rewarded on the basis of 
performance objectives, productivity targets, quality bonuses and 
a profit-sharing plan. It should be remembered that dramatic 
productivity improvements over the past 30 years have been 
achieved in the auto industry without incentive programs. In fact, 
productivity gains in auto have far outstripped those in other 
manufacturing industries and have been the traditional basis for 
UAW claims for higher wages. Incentive pay may really be another 
form of wage-cutting. 
Lastly, the Saturn agreement dramatically alters the structure 
and conduct of labor-management relations and union represen-
tation. The traditional shop steward system, which has been the 
foundation of industrial democracy and free trade unionism, has 
been superseded. Instead, a labor-management consensus system 
has been introduced that stresses mutual interests and enterprise 
unionism. Further, enterprise unionism can lead to local union 
competition, which undermines traditional industrial unionism 
and solidarity. 
The new agreement has not been widely accepted by UAW 
members. Many autoworkers, including those at the GM Lordstown 
facility, feel the contract was unwarranted given the level of past 
concessions. Pete Kelly, a member of the UAW's National GM 
Negotiating Committee, has concluded that the agreement 
"contains all the elements to weaken our Union." Furthermore, 
many UAW members feel slighted by the UAW leadership because 
they were not given an opportunity to ratify the new agreement, 
as is normally the case. Many fear that the Saturn agreement will 
be extended to other settings. 
Stung by criticism from within the union, the UAW leadership 
has argued that the Saturn agreement "is a special case, and not 
to be regarded as a precedent" that can be followed at other GM 
facilities. The UAW has argued that, similar to the first UAW 
Volkswagen Agreement, once the plant is operational, the Saturn 
contract can always be renegotiated to coincide with the basic GM-
UAW pact. Unfortunately, GM President Roger Smith has 
simultaneously announced his intention to "Saturnize" other GM 
facilities. In fact, executives throughout the auto industry have 
announced their intentions to Saturnize. 
How this Saturnizing process occurs can be seen by reviewing 
the present controversy over "new concepts" at GM's J-car 
assembly plants—Lordstown (Ohio), Leeds (Missouri) and 
Janesville (Wisconsin). 
- *—. 
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Coinciding with its announcement to close four existing 
assembly plants, GM this summer demanded that local agreements 
at its J-car facilities be reopened to include what are termed "new 
concepts'—proposals similar to those in the Saturn agreement. 
While the "new concepts" approach is GM's idea, the local unions 
feel compelled to go along in an attempt to achieve a measure of 
job security. In separate letters to their memberships justifying 
-the reopening of their local agreements, shop chairmen Charles 
Johnson (at Leeds) and Al Alii (at Lordstown) have recounted what 
has happened to other local unions that were not interested in 
GM's "new concepts." Both mentioned the Arlington, Texas, plant 
that refused to reopen its contract and lost the new GM-10 project 
to the Doraville, Georgia, plant. Al Alii wrote: 
Today, Doraville, Georgia has the GM-10 instead of Arlington, 
Texas. REASON: Doraville arid their local leadership 
committed to a "new concept" agreement. . . NOW THAT 
IT IS TOO LATE, ARLINGTON WANTS TO CHANGE!! WE 
DON'T WANT TO BECOME ANOTHER ARLINGTON, DO 
WE ?????? 
Given the real fear of reprisals by GM, the three locals have 
entered a competition among themselves to see which will accept 
the most "new concepts." Although the outcome is uncertain at 
this time, all three locals seem to be willing to engage in an 
internecine war. As Charles Johnson told his membership, he is 
obligated to act in the membership's best interest and "to do 
whatever was necessary to try to save this plant." 
Throughout the auto industry, local union officials are asking 
for direction and wondering if the UAW International headquarters 
will permit the local union competition to continue. According 
to the UAW Constitution's Article 19 (Section 6), the International 
Executive Board is to protect local unions who have succeeded 
in establishing favorable working conditions and superior 
agreements from just such competition with local unions and 
plants doing similar work. The Executive Board has thus far been 
unwilling to invoke Article 19. Rather, it has chosen to rely on 
a new section in the 1984 GM-UAW agreement that permits 
changes and waivers of the national agreement with the approval 
of the International union and the corporation. Without the 
International's assistance, many local unionists now believe that 
they have few choices but to accept "new concepts." As one 
ar'oworker at Lordstown said, it's "be Saturnized or else." 
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Economic Decline & Development 
The impact of the Saturn project goes beyond issues related to 
the economic assumptions, technology and labor agreement in the 
auto industry. Saturn has played a pivotal role in the national 
debate over U.S. economic decline and development by shaping 
public consciousness toward business, labor and the public good. 
To study this aspect, it is worthwhile rereading my son's letter 
for in it we can see how Saturn has shaped public perceptions. 
The idea of children being asked by parents, teachers and 
community leaders to write to GM President Smith, begging for 
his intercession, is appalling. Yet, it was matched by an equally 
appalling display of groveling community and political leaders 
offering sacrificial gifts at the altar of the world's largest industrial 
corporation—all in the name of economic development. It made 
no difference that most of the development programs made little 
economic sense on a cost-benefit basis, or for that matter, whether 
GM needed them. What became important was boosterism and 
the appearance of the proper business and investment climate. 
Indeed, the Saturn Project became a mania that represents the 
political and psycho economics of fear and desperation brought 
on by economic decline. The disorder is spreading in several ways. 
First, GM has attempted to build on the Saturn experience by 
initiating legal actions to reduce taxation at existing facilities. For 
example, in Delta Township (near Detroit) GM is attempting to 
roll back current property valuations by 55% in order to reduce 
—i—nrm—rn r~~Ti -*"*** 
A caravan of Youngstown realtors and their families arrive at 
General Motors Technical Center in Warren, Michigan, to plead 
their case for the Saturn project. 
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its tax assessment. 
Second, other corporations have been emboldened by GM's 
experience. As one businessman in Youngstown asked, why should 
we be treated any different than GM? Both new and existing 
businesses are now asking local communities to develop new 
incentives or to renegotiate tax assessments and valuations to 
assure their continued presence. 
Third, there has been considerable "soul searching" about why 
some states and local communities failed to attract the Saturn project. 
For example, in a feature article entitled "What do businesses see 
in Tennessee?" in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the article focused 
on the business climate and stressed such factors as location, weak 
union atmosphere, and a homogeneous workforce. (Homogeneous 
workforce was defined as "one in which the people are the same 
race and have similar values and backgrounds.") 
Fourth, some states have taken criticisms leveled during the 
Saturn campaign to heart. For example, John M. Mutz, Lt. 
Governor of Indiana, boasted that Indiana had cost advantages 
over other midwestern states because its workers' compensation 
and unemployment compensation benefits are low. He bragged, 
"We rank 49th or 50th in cost to employers in almost any survey 
I've seen." Now, in Ohio, which experts agree has the best workers' 
compensation program in the nation, state representatives have 
passed bipartisan legislation which undermines the present law. 
One rationale prominently used to justify the change is the Saturn 
outcome. 
Fifth, the Saturn offensive and subsequent examination of 
business climates has added to the current anti-union environment. 
For example, many states and communities are giving increased 
credibility to what are called manufacturing climate studies. In 
such studies, low unionization levels and right-to-work laws 
translate into higher scores. Coupled with frequent threats and 
actual plant closings, these help shape public attitudes toward 
labor unions. 
Sixth, the Saturn affair has helped define to the public what 
constitutes proper union conduct. The focus on the change from 
adversarial to cooperative attitudes has caused more traditional, 
let alone militant, unionists to be seen as selfish, obstructionist 
and anti-business. At the same time, those unionists espousing 
cooperative principles and concessionary bargaining are seen as 
"enlightened and responsible" labor statesmen. This categorization 
tends to hold irrespective of the actual bargaining conditions or 
management motivation. 
Seventh, the decision to locate Saturn in Tennessee has under-
mined organized 
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According to Alfred Warren, GM vice president of labor relations, 
the UAW was forced to accept the Spring Hill location. He said, 
"I drove the UAW to Tennessee. . . . They didn't want to go there." 
But by relenting to Mr. Warren, the UAW rewarded right-to-work 
state politicians, such as Tennessee Governor Lamar Alexander. 
Governor Alexander has frequently and proudly described 
Tennessee as an "anti-union state." In many cases, midwestern 
politicians are now taking political heat for an unsuccessful Saturn 
bid. Consequently, midwestern politicians who have been largely 
sympathetic to organized labor in the past are now questioning 
their future support for labor's political agenda. 
Finally, Saturn mania has had a chilling effect on the public 
discussion of the relationship between plant closings, unemploy-
ment and corporate deindustrialization. In the early 1980s, there 
existed a spirited national debate concerning the ethics and 
economics of plant shutdowns, including stinging criticisms of 
corporate policies. While courting the Saturn project, local 
business leaders often objected to this discussion of corporate 
behavior for fear that it may "send the wrong signal" to corpora-
tions. Consequently, in place of community discussion of economic 
development, there exists today in many communities only non-
sequitors and the rhetoric of boosterism, free enterprise, unprincipled 
cooperation, and the maintenance of the proper business climate. 
Conclusion 
The Saturn Project has become a potent ideological force and 
conservative influence on public opinion and the political 
economy while at the same time diverting public attention from 
GM's plans to close additional plants, import subcompacts from 
subsidiaries, diversify into high technology and force additional 
concessions from the UAW. 
Overall, Saturn's influence on the public consciousness is 
indicative of just how easily global corporations can shape the 
national economic debate, using sophisticated public relations 
techniques along with a measure of old-fashioned economic 
blackmail. Built on the themes of nationalism, modernity, 
cooperation and technological determinism, Saturn has caught the 
collective imagination and has provided a vision of a better 
economic future if only corporations have their way. This is a 
Faustian bargain, yet one many communities will increasingly 
accept unless alternative visions of economic development are 
seen as attainable. • 
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